Two studies tested the hypothesis that occupying a position of low power increases the likelihood of laughter, presumably as a means of gaining friends and supporters. In Study 1, participants laughed more at an interviewer's jokes when the interviewer controlled their cash rewards than in the absence of monetary contingencies. Study 2 found that low-power participants (manipulated again by expecting that someone else would decide their cash rewards) laughed more than high-power participants even when they were alone.
Low power also increased laughing at a fellow lowpower coworker. These findings suggest that low power motivates interest in making friends and hence increases behaviors that promote social bonding. Keywords: power; money; humor; laughter; dependency L aughter is partly a result of evaluating some stimulus as funny, but that explanation is at best incomplete. Some people laugh when things are not funny, and the amount of laughter can vary widely even in response to a funny stimulus. This research was based on the assumption that one function of laughter is to strengthen social bonds and elicit liking. In particular, we sought to study the possible links between laughter and power. The central hypothesis was that low power makes people inclined to laugh, possibly because laughter may generally serve to increase the chances of gaining social support and allies.
We acknowledge that the opposite prediction could be made, namely, that power holders would be the biggest laughers. A seminal article on power by Keltner, Gruenfeld, and Anderson (2003) proposed that high power makes people more focused on their own satisfaction and more something is funny-is that laughing may be a means for those in a position of low power to gain affiliation.
There are several plausible reasons to think that laughter may be a means of strengthening social bonds and garnering liking. First, people like people who laugh and who have a good sense of humor (Fraley & Aron, 2004; Hewitt, 1958; Reysen, 2005; Sprecher & Regan, 2002) , so laughing does elicit liking. Second, the fact that the same stimulus elicits more laughter when others are present than when one is alone (Malpass & Fitzpatrick, 1959; Martin & Kuiper, 1999; Provine & Fischer, 1989) could indicate that laughter is connected to social bonding. This effect of laughing more in the presence of others appears to be stronger with a samesex friend than with a same-sex stranger, indicating that social relatedness contributes to laughter (Devereux & Ginsburgh, 2001; Foot, Chapman, & Smith, 1977) . When people are in the presence of an opposite-sex stranger, laughter may be used to show romantic interest, which indicates that laughter can also be instrumental in the formation of new heterosexual relationships (Grammer, 1990) .
Third, laughter is contagious. Simply hearing laughter causes people to laugh (Provine, 1992) . Until recently, most televised situation comedies used the contagious nature of laughter to improve viewers' responses to onscreen humor by playing canned laughter, or laugh tracks, following a punch line. However, researchers have found that canned laughter only improves the reaction to humorous material when the laughter is perceived as coming from in-group members rather than from out-group members (Platow et al., 2005) . Thus, the contagious nature of laughter does not extend to out-group members, which again underlines the socialbonding function of laughter. Fourth, nervous laughter in the absence of humor may occur in awkward, uncertain situations in which the person might well be wishing for social support. For example, Milgram (1963) observed that some participants in his (starkly unfunny) obedience studies had long, even uncontrollable laughing fits.
Theorists have argued that these social and communicative benefits of humor are the product of evolution Van Hooff, 1972; Vettin & Todt, 2005) . According to this view, both smiling and laughing are unconscious social strategies through which signalers influence perceivers. Specifically, smiling and laughing function as a means to induce affiliation and reciprocal altruism. Fridlund (1994) likewise argued that smiling (and possibly laughter as well, although that is an inference on our part) should be considered a social behavior aimed at the formation of friendship instead of necessarily communicating something about the person's happiness. More broadly, Fridlund suggested that facial expressions and nonverbal displays function as social tools that provide others with cues as to a person's intentions, rather than functioning as involuntary revelations of one's emotional state. This social-tool view of facial expressions and nonverbal displays is based on research demonstrating that the same stimulus can elicit different facial expressions depending on whether one is alone or with a friend-even if that friend is only imagined (Fridlund, 1991b; Fridlund et al., 1990 ; see also Parkinson, 2005) .
The effect of laughter on its listeners has been described as similar to the effect on adult caregivers of an infant crying: Both laughter and crying are nonverbal behaviors that enable a dependent or even thoroughly powerless vocalizer to elicit a desired behavior from a more powerful individual (Owren & Bachorowski, 2003) . In particular, laughing is described as having evolved to alert perceivers to the laughing person's positive affect, which aided early hominids in communication and cooperation and may thereby have helped improve reproduction and survival (see . Another plausible scenario for the evolution of laughter holds that laughter enhanced early humans' capacity to signal positive affect or nonaggression. This decreased the chances that early humans making such a signal would be socially excluded (such as when individuals are perceived as a threat) and improved the chances that they would be allowed access to the life-sustaining benefits of group membership (Baumeister & Leary, 1995) .
These evolutionary accounts are mainly speculative, although one can point to some observations as support. For instance, nonhuman primates such as the common chimpanzee, the pygmy chimpanzee, and the Barbary macaque produce a positively toned, pantlike vocalization during tickling or rough play that is similar to laughter (de Waal, 1988; Marler & Tenaza, 1977; Van Hooff, 1972; Vettin & Todt, 2005) . Some acoustic properties of human laughter during tickling and the vocalizations of Barbary macaques and chimpanzees during play are similar (Vettin & Todt, 2005) . The implication for the current hypothesis is that if nonhuman primates use something like human laughter to indicate play (rather than aggression), one function of human laughter may be to demonstrate a similarly nonaggressive, playful stance. Signaling such a stance could be beneficial to people who lack power and would therefore suffer if the interaction took an aggressive turn. Perhaps more striking than the acoustic similarities, however, is that a behavior that is common in humans is quite rare in nonhuman primates and animals (Provine, 1996) . Nonhuman animals may show signs of using laughter, but they do so less frequently and in a less complex manner than humans.
Hearing laughter can cause an instant improvement in affect. Not all laughter elicits positive affect equally, however. Bachorowski and Owren (2001) found that people who produced voiced, songlike laughs were rated as friendlier and sexier than those who produced unvoiced laughter (characterized by grunts, pants, and snorts). Participants also expressed more desire to meet those whose laughs were voiced than those whose laughs were not voiced. The uplifting impact of hearing laughter suggests that laughing may actually be an effective means to influence how one is treated by those who hear one's laughter, as it could cause the hearer to become positively disposed to the laughing person. In sum, there is ample evidence to suggest that one function of laughter is to promote liking and social acceptance.
We do not mean to suggest that the sole purpose of laughter is the elicitation of liking and social support. There are other possible motives for laughter in addition to evaluating something as humorous. For instance, researchers have argued that speakers may laugh as a way of clarifying the meaning of their speech, as evidenced by the high frequency of laughter following speakers' own statements (Provine, 1993; Vettin & Todt, 2004) . Foot and Chapman (1976) characterized laughter as a means to maintain the interest and attention of the conversational partner. The different accounts hypothesize different central roles for laughter, but they do seem to agree that laughter serves a communicative and affiliative purpose. One leading researcher flatly concluded that laughter "has more to do with relationships than with jokes" (Provine, 2001, p. 3). To our knowledge, the effect of power relationships on laughter is as yet untested.
Power and Approach: A Competing Hypothesis
Our hypothesis that those in a low position of power are more likely than others to laugh is a potential contradiction of power approach theory (Keltner et al, 2003) . According to power approach theory, lowpower individuals are less likely than high-power individuals to engage in affiliative behaviors, to experience positive emotions, and to express positive emotions. There are some observations to support the hypothesis that those in a position of high power would be more likely than those in low power to laugh. For instance, the subjective feeling of power is correlated with the feeling of amusement (Anderson, Langner, & Keltner, 2001 , as cited in Keltner et al., 2003) , which is consistent with the prediction that high power increases laughter. Similarly, a study in which fraternity members teased each other found that higher power members expressed more smiles of pleasure than their lower power peers (Keltner, Young, Heerey, Oemig, & Monarch, 1998) , which likewise lends credibility to the hypothesis that power holders are more likely than lowpower people to laugh. Furthermore, a sense of power increases one's general willingness to act (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003) , which, given that laughter is an action, would also be consistent with the idea that high-power people would be more likely than lowpower people to produce laughter. We cite these findings as evidence that both hypotheses are plausible, namely, that either high power or low power could conceivably induce laughter.
Laughter and Low Power
Our research tested the hypothesis that people in positions of low power would laugh more than those with high power. Although we have not found any prior work that linked laughter to power, the connection is plausible. This hypothesis was based on the assumption that people in low positions of power are in a dependent and vulnerable position and therefore need others to like them. Prior work has shown that people in positions of low power and dependency focus more attention on their interaction partners than do people in positions of high power (Erber & Fiske, 1984) . Enhanced attention to others might increase laughing insofar as paying more attention to others makes one less likely to miss the joke. Indeed, there is empirical evidence that, compared to high-power people, those who are in a position of low power not only pay more attention to those in greater positions of power but also work harder to make a good impression on highly powerful people as measured by the kinds of questions that are asked during negotiation (De Dreu & Van Kleef, 2004) . Specifically, when low-power individuals negotiate with those in a higher position of power, they are more likely to ask questions sensitive to the higher power person's beliefs-demonstrating empathy and a desire to please the higher power person (see Leyens, Dardenne, & Fiske, 1998) . In addition, when low-power people negotiate, they are more likely than high-power people to ask diagnostic questions as opposed to leading questions, indicating greater attention and a desire to develop an accurate impression of someone (De Dreu & Van Kleef, 2004) . The greater attention itself is a reflection of dependency insofar as the powerless person's outcomes are shaped by the whims and affections of the power holder, and so acquiring knowledge about the powerful person may afford the dependent person a measure of predictive control.
Insofar as laughter elicits liking, powerless people should be quick to laugh. Low-power people should mainly be prone to laugh at the person who holds power over them, but perhaps a general desire for allies and supporters would make low-power people prone to laugh at anyone.
Current Investigation
In two studies, we test the hypothesis that those in a position of low power would be more likely than others to laugh. Laughter is a behavior that does not lend itself to easy measurement. Laughter has been previously measured in several ways, with each method having inherent strengths and weaknesses. As stated earlier, researchers have demonstrated that voiced laughter elicits positive ratings from perceivers to a greater extent than unvoiced laughter does. Thus, the voicing of laughter and other acoustic properties of laughter have been prominent in the quantification of laughter. However, laughter also varies in the extent to which it animates an individual physically-from the proverbial knee slap to getting tears in one's eyes to the typical muscular spasms associated with laughter. This is a largely neglected dimension of the measurement of laughter. Furthermore, a facial expression can vary widely as a function of an individual's emotional state and is therefore another important cue to one's response to humor (Darwin, 1872 (Darwin, /1999 Provine, 1997) . Although most analyses have quantified laughter exclusively on the basis of the auditory aspects (number of occurrences of laughter and length of laughter or acoustic properties such as amplitude and modulation), our analysis sought to measure laughter in a way that would minimize the limits of focusing exclusively on the auditory aspects of laughter. The approach taken here was to have independent observers simply rate how intensely they thought an individual was laughing. Our assumption was that if a high degree of interrater reliability could be attained, we would have a valid measurement of laughter that did not neglect any one aspect of quantifying laughter.
The humorousness of the stimuli was also of interest to us. In particular, we wanted to establish whether the hypothesized effects of power on laughter were stronger for objectively funny or unfunny jokes. It is plausible that low power would intensify laughter primarily for jokes that are unfunny. This would be consistent with a strategic explanation for low-power laughter, given that low-power people would seemingly have little reason to laugh other than sending an ingratiatory message. Equally plausible is the possibility that low-power people laugh more when the stimulus is actually funny, because a humorous stimulus may afford them the opportunity to demonstrate playfulness and likeability. We therefore prerated the jokes participants heard so as to distinguish better between these two possibilities.
STUDY 1
Study 1 manipulated power by placing some participants in a situation of explicit dependency on another person. Specifically, participants were told that they would be interviewed and that the interviewer would have the power to bestow or withhold a substantial cash prize. Power can be defined as control over another person's outcomes (Keltner et al., 2003) , and so having one's cash reward decided by someone else is a suitable operationalization of being in a low-power situation. Based on the hypothesis that low power leads to laughing, we predicted that participants would laugh most in that low-power situation.
Several features of the experimental design deserve comment. This study did not include a high-power condition, and the control condition was simply an interview where there was no mention of money. This was done because of the explicit focus on low power arising from our hypotheses. (Hence, using this control group enabled us to be sure that any differences would be due specifically to the effects of low power.) Furthermore, to reduce the possibility that some laughter may be flirtatious (e.g., Grammer, 1990) , we restricted this study to same-gender interactions. To elicit laughter, the interviewer was scripted with a series of jokes designed to vary along several dimensions, including some jokes being less funny than others.
Method
Participants. Thirty-two female undergraduates participated in this study in exchange for partial course credit and $3. Data from 6 additional participants were discarded from all analyses because 3 participants discovered the hidden video camera and 3 participants declined to allow video of their session to be used.
Procedure. Participants arrived at the laboratory ostensibly for an interview regarding the spending habits of college students. Two female research assistants were present; one acted as the experimenter, the other as the interviewer. The laboratory was equipped with a hidden video camera that was aimed at a chair occupied by the participant during the course of the experiment. Participants signed a consent form containing the bolded phrase "I understand that my behavior and responses will be assessed and evaluated by researchers" because participants were to be filmed without their knowledge.
The experimental manipulation of power was administered in the subsequent instructions. The experimenter told participants in the low-power condition that the interviewer was "going to pick some of today's participants to receive a substantial cash prize. If you are selected, we only ask you to tell us how you plan on spending the money." The experimenter continued, "We are obligated to inform you that the cash prize is not awarded randomly. The interviewer will decide who gets the money." In the control condition, participants heard no mention of a cash prize.
After this power manipulation but prior to meeting the interviewer, all participants were asked to list items they would like to purchase if they had more money. Thus, all participants were asked to think about things they wanted but could not afford, although only participants in the low-power condition would be expecting to meet someone who might provide them the means to purchase the items they desired. When participants indicated that they had completed the list, the interviewer entered the room and greeted the participants.
As it was the experimenter who set participants' expectations of the interviewer's capacity to bestow money on them, we were able to keep the interviewer blind to condition. This was to ensure that the interviewer did not inadvertently tell the jokes differently based on participants' expectations of her. On meeting the participant, the interviewer asked the participant to relocate to the other chair in the room, at which a hidden video camera was pointed. The interviewer then began asking the participant questions and writing down her answers from an interview script regarding schooling, areas of academic interest, and possible careers. During the interview, the interviewer made several jokes that she had been trained to deliver in the same way regardless of reaction. The interviewer delivered each question and joke in a steady (deadpan) voice.
On hearing the participant's age (M = 19.3), the interviewer quipped, "OK, I'll just write down 'over the hill.'" Later, the interviewer asked participants how many years before they intended to graduate (M = 3.4). The interviewer then queried, "So you've decided against the 8-to 10-year plan?" After asking if participants had considered law school, the interviewer said, That reminds me of a lawyer joke I just heard. A lawyer is standing in a long line at the post office. Suddenly, he feels a pair of hands massaging his shoulders, back, and neck. The lawyer turns around. "What the hell do you think you're doing?" "I'm a chiropractor," says the man. "I'm just keeping in practice while I'm waiting in line." The lawyer replies, "Well, I'm a lawyer, but do you see me screwing the guy in front of me?" Continuing in the same monotone voice, the interview made another joke. "So there are these two muffins baking in an oven. One of them yells, 'Damn, it's hot in here!' And the other muffin replies, 'Holy Crap, a talking muffin!'" After completing the interview, the interviewer excused herself and the experimenter returned. At this point, the participant was debriefed, the camera was revealed, and the experimenter paid the participant. The experimenter gave each participant the choice of whether to release video of the session to the researchers or to have it erased on the spot.
Ratings of jokes.
To ascertain whether the effects of power on laughter were driven primarily by participants' reactions to funny or unfunny jokes, we conducted an independent pilot study to provide us with objective measures of the humorousness of the jokes in the study. Eighty-six undergraduates read a transcript of the study and rated the four jokes from 1 (very unfunny) to 21 (very funny) in exchange for course credit. Consistent with our expectations, the highest ratings went to the lawyer joke (M = 14.48, SD = 4.38) and the muffin joke (M = 14.93, SD = 5.65). The quip about being "over the hill" was poorly rated (M = 5.55, SD = 4.29), as was the comment about not being on the 8-to 10-year plan (M = 5.13, SD = 3.57). The average rating of the two funny jokes (M = 14.70, SD = 4.08) was significantly higher than the average of the two unfunny jokes (M = 5.34, SD = 3.19), t(85) = 21.37, p < .001. We therefore had a suitable operationalization of funny and unfunny jokes, which would permit us to test which kind of joke is more responsive to power.
Coding of tapes.
The video of all participants who consented to its use was rated by three research assistants who were blind to the experimental hypothesis and condition. Prior to rating, the video was edited to ensure that the raters only saw the interview and did not see to which condition participants were assigned. Research assistants rated each instance of laughter on a scale from 1 (very weak or inaudible laughter) to 21 (loud, boisterous, energetic laughter). We summed ratings from the two funny jokes to measure participants' reaction to funny jokes. In other words, we added the ratings of one funny joke to the ratings of the other funny joke for the three individual raters and then averaged these scores to create our dependent measure of laughter at funny jokes. To determine participants' reactions to unfunny jokes, we combined ratings for the two unfunny jokes as well as ratings of laughter that was not clearly in response to the confederate's jokessuch as when participants laughed at their own statements or seemingly at nothing in particular.
There was good interrater reliability for ratings of laughter as measured by intraclass correlations (ICC; Shrout & Fleiss, 1979) . Ratings for laughter in response to the four individual jokes, as well as ratings for the laughter that was not strictly in response to the interviewer's jokes, varied from fair, ICC(3, k) = .77, to good, ICC(3, k) = .87. The average interrater reliability for these individual instances of laughter was .83. To further ensure that we had a valid measure of laughter, we calculated each rater's total laughter ratings for all bouts of laughter during the experiment. The overall laughter scores also demonstrated good reliability, ICC(3, k) = .87. There was agreement among raters regarding participant laughter as measured by ratings of individual jokes or by total ratings over the course of the experiment. In other words, raters agreed as to when a participant was laughing heartily versus chuckling politely.
Before rating the laughter in the current study, raters assessed several hundred instances of laughter in a suite of unrelated studies (Stillman & Baumeister, 2007) . In these unrelated studies, raters openly discussed their laughter ratings with each other and with practice became able to independently rate the intensity of instances of laughter reliably. Thus, the high interrater reliability demonstrated by our research assistants is partly a product of practice and experience.
Results

Laughter.
A mixed-design ANOVA was used to analyze laughter as a function of power condition and type of joke. We observed a significant main effect for power as measured by mean laughter rating, such that lowpower participants laughed more (M = 9.86, SD = 4.30) than control participants (M = 5.66, SD = 3.79), F(1, 30) = 8.48, p = .007. The estimated effect size was large, d = 1.04 (Cohen, 1977) . Thus, our central hypothesis that low power increases laughter was supported.
Laughter also varied as a function of the type of joke, indicating that in general participants laughed more at the funny jokes (M = 11.46, SD = 5.44) than at jokes rated as unfunny (M = 4.32, SD = 4.36), F(1, 30) = 114.70, p < .001, d = 1.45. Establishing that funny jokes evoke more laughter than unfunny jokes was not a central aim of this research, as the relationship is fairly obvious. Although Provine (1996) may be correct in his assertion that social relationships are more important than humorous quality in the elicitation of laughter, these findings suggest that being funny is still a significant cause of laughter.
The main effects were qualified by a marginally significant power by joke-quality interaction, F(1, 30) = 3.39, p = .076. Thus, although participants who heard unfunny jokes laughed somewhat more in the lowpower condition (M = 5.73, SD = 4.93) relative to the control condition (M = 2.74, SD = 3.05), F(1, 30) = 4.12, p = .051, d = .73, the marginally significant interaction suggested that the laughter-inducing effects of low power were more pronounced in response to the funny jokes (M = 14.00, SD = 4.61) as opposed to the unfunny jokes (M = 8.58, SD = 4.96), F(1, 30) = 10.24, p = .003, d = 1.13 (see Figure 1) . In short, being in a low position of power amplified the laughter response, particularly following a funny joke. Given the low amount of laughter elicited by the unfunny jokes overall (M = 4.32, SD = 4.36), we hesitate to conclude that low power only affects funny jokes, because responses to the unfunny jokes could suffer from a floor effect.
Discussion
The interviewer told the same jokes to all participants, but those participants who depended on the interviewer for a possible cash prize laughed considerably more than participants who did not depend on the interviewer for a cash prize. This fits the view that low power increases laughter and is at odds with the alternative hypothesis, namely, that laughter mainly goes with high power. This effect was marginally stronger when the joke was relatively funny than when less funny.
STUDY 2
Study 2 was designed to resolve some ambiguities about the findings of Study 1. When a low-power person laughs at a joke by a power holder, this could be a deliberate attempt to ingratiate or an involuntary response stemming from a difference in perception due to dependency. To shed light on this question, we replaced the live interaction with a videotape. The participant was alone in the room when hearing the partner's videotaped jokes, and so laughter could not directly communicate a positive, ingratiating message to the partner.
Another question was whether low power makes a person more generally willing to laugh, as opposed to laughing specifically at the power holder. The difference would presumably reflect different social strategies. Are people who lack power more likely to laugh in general, or are they more likely to laugh just at the person who holds the power over them? If low-power people are likely to laugh purely as a means of winning the favor of those higher in power, then low-power people should only laugh at those people who exert power over them. In contrast, if the motivation for increased laughter among low-power people is based on a broad, nonspecific desire to gain allies and supporters, then lowpower people might show increased laughter both toward a person high in power and a person who is not high in power. To examine this, we had the participant hear jokes made by someone who was either relatively lower or higher in power. In a third condition, both the participant and the joke-telling confederate were low in power relative to a third person.
Method
Participants. Ninety-seven female undergraduates participated in this study in exchange for course credit and $3. Data from 12 additional participants were dropped from all analyses: 8 discovered the hidden camera and 4 declined to release video of the session to experimenters.
Procedure. Participants arrived at the laboratory for a study ostensibly regarding workplace interactions. The laboratory was equipped with a hidden video camera so that the participant's behavior could be monitored without activating self-awareness, self-presentational concerns, and other effects of knowing that one is being filmed. After giving informed consent, the female experimenter told the participant that the study was going to assess impression formation in coworkers. The participant was told that she would be meeting another female participant, but before meeting her face-to-face the two would make videotaped self-introductions to each other. Thus, there was both one acknowledged camera and one hidden camera. In fact, there was no other participant, only a prerecorded videotaped introduction of a female research assistant. The participant did not make a videotape introduction. We were only interested in her reaction to the prerecorded introduction.
Instructions by the experimenter manipulated the three experimental conditions (boss, underling, and coworker-named for the participant's role relative to the confederate). Participants randomly assigned to the boss condition (high power) were told that they had been assigned the role of boss and that other student with whom they would be interacting had been assigned the role of employee. As the boss, they were told, "You will decide how to distribute the money for this study session. At the end of the study, you will decide how much of the money allotted for today's experiment goes to you and how much goes to the other student." Those in the boss condition were further told that they could neither keep all of the money for themselves nor split the money 50-50. This was done to head off any assumption that the money would be divided equally, thereby highlighting the need for an ad hoc decision about how to divide it (and by implication the requirement to use the power).
Participants in the underling condition were told that they had been assigned the role of employee and that the other participant had been assigned the role of boss. Participants in this condition were told that the other participant would control how much they would get paid for the study, with the same stipulations that the boss could neither keep all the money nor distribute it equally.
In the coworker condition, the experimenter described herself as the boss and stated that she would decide how money would be distributed to the two participants. Again, the participant was told that the experimenter could not divide the money evenly. Thus, the participant was in a vulnerable, dependent, low-power position, but she would be laughing (or not) in response to someone other than the power holder.
After describing the participant's role and thereby assigning the experimental condition, the experimenter left, ostensibly to check on the other participant. Approximately 6 minutes later, the experimenter returned to the participant with the previously recorded videotape and the video camera to play the tape. Before showing the participant the video, however, the experimenter gave the participant a list of suggested topics that the "other student" supposedly had been given as a guide for making the tape. Suggested topics included "Tell about an embarrassing moment," "Talk about your academic goals," "Describe how you define success," and "Tell your favorite joke." The list of suggested topics was presented to participants to make the confederate's humorous videotape appear legitimate.
The experimenter left the room, leaving the participant alone to watch the video. The videotape was approximately 6 minutes and included the muffin joke described in Study 1. There was also a joke about a young man who was bodiless from the neck down, who died pursuing true love-the moral of which was that "he should have quit while he was a head." In addition to some serious reflections on the nature of success and other topics, the videotape contained the research assistant's embarrassing tale of accidentally swallowing a quarter in the course of a drinking game.
At the conclusion of the videotape, the experimenter returned to the room and gave the participant a questionnaire packet on which to rate her initial impression of the individual on the tape (described as boss, employee, or coworker as was appropriate with the condition to which the participant had been assigned). On completion of the questionnaires, the participant signaled the experimenter to return. At this point, participants expected to make a videotaped introduction of their own, but this was not necessary for the purposes of the study. The participant was debriefed, the camera was revealed, and the participant was paid. The experimenter gave each participant the option of releasing video of the session to the researchers or to have it erased forthwith.
Ratings of jokes.
We again sought to determine whether jokes that are objectively funny or unfunny drive the laughter of those in low positions of power. We conducted a second independent pilot study in which participants read a transcript of the videotaped introduction in Study 2 and rated the three jokes from 1 (very unfunny) to 21 (very funny). Fifty undergraduates completed the ratings in exchange for course credit. The muffin joke was rated highest (M = 12.04, SD = 4.79), which was significantly higher than the "should have quit while a head" joke (M = 7.62, SD = 4.27), t(49) = 5.79, p < .001, and the drinking game story (M = 6.12, SD = 4.38), t(49) = 6.28, p < .001. The "a head" joke and the drinking game story were not significantly different, t(49) = 1.87, p = .07. We therefore had ratings for a funny joke (muffin joke) and unfunny jokes ("a head" joke and drinking game story), which allowed us to determine which kind of joke is more likely to elicit laughter from those low in power.
Coding of tapes. Three research assistants (two women) who were kept ignorant as to hypotheses and experimental condition viewed and rated the experimental sessions. Again, raters assessed participants' individual instances of laugher from 1 (very weak or inaudible laughter) to 21 (loud, boisterous, energetic laughter). While participants occasionally laughed at their own statements in Study 1, this was not the case with the videotaped introduction. We only witnessed laughter in response to the three jokes. Interrater reliability for instances of laughter in response to the three jokes varied from adequate, ICC(3, k) = .67, to good, ICC(3, k) = .84. The average interrater reliability for individual instances of laughter was .76. To further ensure that raters were in agreement as to the extent of laughter demonstrated by participants over the course of the experiment, we combined ratings of all the individual bouts of laughter for each rater. These summed ratings for all the instances of laughter showed good interrater reliability, ICC(3, k) = .86.
Results and Discussion
Laughing. A mixed-design ANOVA was used to analyze participants' laughter as a function of the type of joke and power condition. Power had a significant effect on laughter, as measured by raters' average rating, F(2, 94) = 3.56, p = .032. Participants in the underling condition laughed more (M = 2.89, SD = 3.20) than participants in the boss condition (M = 1.31, SD = 2.17), F(1, 68) = 5.22, p =.025, d = .58 (see Figure 2 ). This finding replicates Study 2, with the difference that the participant was alone when laughing. Thus, underlings laughed at the boss's jokes even when the boss was not physically present. Apparently, low-power people were particularly responsive to the power holder's jokes. That this tendency remained significant even when participants were alone is evidence that their laughing is not just a barefaced attempt to curry favor with the boss by laughing at her jokes in her presence.
The coworker condition also elicited substantial laughter. Participants in this condition were in a lowpower situation insofar as the experimenter controlled their cash rewards, but they were laughing at someone (a coworker) who was not holding power over them, nor was the power holder present. Nonetheless, participants in this condition laughed significantly more (M = 3.00, SD = 3.15) than those in the boss condition, F(1, 62) = 5.32, p = .023, d = .62. The underling and coworker conditions did not differ in the intensity of laughter, F(1, 62) < 1, ns. One might interpret these findings as indicating that high power reduces laughter. However, in Study 1 the low-power condition evoked more laughter than a control condition in which money was not mentioned, so high power was not necessary to produce low laughter. Taken together, the results of the two studies suggest that having low power causes people to laugh. Our findings also speak against the hypothesis derived from power approach theory, that power holders would laugh the most.
PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN
Which jokes? As in Study 1, the funny jokes yielded the biggest effects of power on laughter. The ANOVA revealed a main effect such that the less funny jokes elicited less laughter (M = 1.28, SD = 2.14) than did the highly rated muffin joke (M = 3.46, SD = 3.92), F(1, 94) = 94.30, p < .001, d = .69. There was a significant interaction between type of joke and power condition, F(2, 94) = 3.40, p = .04. Participants in the underling condition (M = 1.63, SD = 2.48) and the coworker condition (M = 1.64, SD = 2.27) laughed more at the two unfunny jokes than did participants in the boss condition (M = .623, SD = 1.46). The difference between the laughter in the boss condition and the combination of the underling and coworker conditions (M = 1.64, SD = 2.37) was significant, F(1, 94) = 5.08, p = .03, d = .52. This effect was even stronger when the joke was funny. In response to the funny joke, participants in the underling condition (M = 4.15, SD = 4.15) and the coworker condition (M = 4.37, SD = 4.22) laughed much more than did participants in the boss condition (M = 2.01, SD = 3.00). The difference between the laughter in the boss condition and the combination of both lowpower conditions (M = 4.25, SD = 4.15) was significant, F(1, 94) = 7.69, p = .007, d = .62.
Thus, the tendency for those without power to laugh was driven primarily by funny jokes, as evidenced by a marginally significant power × type of joke interaction in Study 1 and a significant power × type of joke interaction in Study 2. Again, we qualify our interpretation of the interaction by observing that the low amount of laughter elicited by the unfunny jokes could indicate a floor effect. Another way of interpreting this invokes the idea that laughter is primarily a way of communicating playfulness as opposed to fondness or appeasement (see Van Hooff, 1972) . If this is the case, then it may be that the unfunny jokes were not viewed by participants as a legitimate context for communicating playfulness.
Participants in Study 2 were alone when they laughed, unlike in Study 1. Although the pattern of findings meshes well with that in Study 1, this should not be taken to mean that aloneness versus company is irrelevant to laughter. All measures (median, mode, etc.) showed substantially less laughter in Study 2 than in Study 1. In fact, the highest average score a participant received in Study 2 for intensity of laughter was only 14 on a 21-point scale, whereas it was 21 in Study 1. In addition, the modal score of laughter response for Study 2 was zero, although this nonresponse was most common in the boss condition. This is supportive of the view of laughter as a social, interpersonal act.
We do not interpret the finding that low power is conducive to laughing when alone as wholly incompatible with laughing serving a communicative role. To the contrary, the substantial difference in laughter when the stimulus was produced by a person (Study 1) compared to a videotape (Study 2) is consistent with a communicative role for laughter. However, finding that differences in power elicit different amounts of laughter when participants are alone does indicate that laughing is not strictly a form of communication, nor is it necessarily a product of evaluating a stimulus as funny.
Thus, the findings from Study 2 provide converging evidence that low power increases laughter. Participants assigned to low-power positions (underling or coworker), compared to participants assigned to a high-power position (boss), laughed more at the jokes of another participant. This increased laughter among low-power participants was shown in the absence of an actual interaction with the person telling the jokes, although all participants anticipated interacting with the person who told the jokes later in the session.
Ratings of the stimulus person's sense of humor did not vary by condition, F(2, 90) = 2.14, ns. We are hesitant to place much weight on a null finding, but these results could be taken to suggest that the laughter differences do not reflect differential enjoyment of the same jokes. Put another way, these results suggest that low power led participants to laugh more despite not finding the jokes any funnier. This conclusion would fit well with the argument that a generalized inclination to laugh readily is an unthinking response to a low-power situation that serves the function of making oneself seem appealing to anyone else who might notice.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
How does one make sense of an apparently interpersonal communication produced when alone? Research indicates that laughter is not the only apparently communicative action people make while alone. Our findings fit nicely with the work of Fridlund (1991b) , who investigated smiling while alone. There is some obvious overlap between smiling and laughing, but ethological research suggests a subtle distinction: Laughter expresses playfulness, whereas smiling is an indication of fondness and appeasement (Van Hooff, 1972) . Still, both smiling and laughing are social tools by which individuals can communicate a positive stance toward others, so research on the social cues that evoke smiles is instructive. Fridlund (1991b) showed solitary participants pleasant, uplifting video clips such as a baby playing with a rattle. When participants viewed the video clips with a friend, they smiled more than participants who saw the video clips alone. However, some participants who brought a friend also watched the video alone, while believing that their friend was watching the same video clip in a different room at the same moment. When this was the case, participants smiled as much as they did when they were actually in the presence of a friend. In another condition, participants who brought a friend to the lab were told that their friend was doing something other than watching the video clips. These participants smiled less than those who saw the video with a friend or who saw the video under the impression that a friend was also watching it. Thus, only participants who were actually with a friend or who thought a friend was watching the same video clip showed an increase in smiling over simple solitary viewing. Fridlund explained these findings by proposing implicit sociality, defined as the imagining of social interactants when alone. He concluded that "solitary faces occur for the same reasons as public ones, if only because when we are alone we create social interactions in our imaginations" (p. 239). Implicit sociality provides explanations for two important questions raised by Study 2: One, participants laughed alone because they had an audience in mind, and two, the different amounts of laughter evoked according to condition were due to the different audiences participants had in mind when watching the tape.
To be sure, participants who were alone expected soon to meet the person whose jokes they were laughing at, and so their laughter could be considered a kind of mood regulation or warm-up to prepare them to be positive and responsive during the upcoming meeting (see Erber, Wegner, & Therriault, 1996 , on mood regulation prior to social interaction). This interactionexpectation explanation for laughing when alone was also put forward by Fridlund (1991a) , who suggested one reason people's faces express emotions when alone is a kind of automatic anticipatory response.
Across two studies, we found that people in positions of low power laughed more than others. Our main finding was that they laughed more at jokes told by the person who held power over them, as compared to laughing at the same jokes told in the absence of a power or dependency situation and as compared to the same jokes told by someone over whom the listener had power. The alternative hypothesis of high power increasing willingness to laugh (based on Keltner et al., 2003) was not supported. In Study 1, we found that participants laughed more when interacting with an interviewer they believed held power over them as compared to participants who were told nothing about money or power. In Study 2, participants assigned to a high-power position laughed less than participants assigned to positions of low power. Study 2 also showed that low-power people laughed more at jokes told by someone who did not hold power over them. These results seem best to fit the hypothesis that low power creates a sense of vulnerability and dependency and therefore motivates a broad interest in being perceived as playful and nonthreatening. In other words, given that people like people who laugh (Fraley & Aron, 2004; Hewitt, 1958; Reysen, 2005; Sprecher & Regan, 2002) and given that low-power people stand to gain from the positive regard of high-power people, laughter may be one manifestation of a desire to be viewed as likeable, playful, and nonthreatening.
The treatment of laughter as a social strategy is an interpretation on our part partly because the alternative explanation that low power leads directly to more enjoyment is implausible. In general, high power brings more positive emotion, whereas low power brings negative emotion (Keltner et al., 2003) , and so these results had to overcome that pattern to link laughter to low power. The ratings of sense of humor also suggested that low power did not make the jokes seem funnier-it merely made the person more likely to laugh at them, funny or not.
By emphasizing laughter rather than self-reports of feeling amused, we deliberately put our focus on actual behavior rather than on inner states. The American Psychological Association declared this the Decade of Behavior, but very little current research in social and personality psychology involves the actual measurement of behavior because researchers have increasingly opted for self-report measures (Baumeister & Vohs, 2006) . Thus, although our approach is out of step with the prevailing trends in the field, it is in keeping with the idea of psychology as the study of behavior. Measuring behavior is a crucial part of the science of psychology, and we suggest that laughter is a particularly interesting behavior to measure, for two reasons. First, although nonhuman primates do show signs of laughter (de Waal, 1988; Vettin & Todt, 2005) , other species do not compare to humans in the frequency of laughter or the complex and puzzling reasons laughter is evoked (Provine, 1996) . Although we have focused on the more playful, upbeat aspect of laughter, it can be used to ridicule and belittle out-groups (LaFave & Mannell, 1976) , to improve one's health (Bennett, Zeller, Rosenberg, & McCann, 2003) , and to overcome grief (Bonanno & Keltner, 1997) . There is no evidence for these in nonhuman primates. Although laughter is not entirely exclusive to humans, the human uses of laughter are vastly more complicated that those of other species. Our contention is that the unique uses of human laughter present an opportunity for insights into the human condition.
Second, Laughter is an ever-present aspect of human life. Our search of the literature revealed no evidence for cultures in which laughter is absent. Furthermore, humans are able to laugh before they are able to use language (Sroufe & Wunsch, 1972) , and most people laugh many times every day. Self-report studies have estimated the average frequency of laughter per person per day to be between 13.4 (Mannell & McMohan, 1982) and 17.6 (Martin & Kuiper, 1999) . However, observational research suggests that these estimates vastly underestimate the frequency of laughter. By closely observing naturally occurring instances of laughter, researchers found an average of 5.8 instances of laughter in every 10 minutes of conversation (Vettin & Todt, 2004) . Human interactions are saturated with this peculiar nonverbal behavior. We suggest that laughter deserves empirical investigation given its abundance in human interactions. In short, the scientific investigation of laughter allows researchers the advantages of observing behaviors that are both pervasive in human interactions and somewhat distinctively human.
Future Directions
Although we have provided evidence that being in a position of low power increases the likelihood of laughter, we cannot say conclusively why this is the case. Research has demonstrated that low-power people pay closer attention and try harder to impress those in higher positions of power (De Dreu & Van Kleef, 2004) . This is a plausible explanation for our findings, but further direct confirmation is needed. Although there is reason to believe that low-power individuals laugh to be viewed more positively-because laughing does induce liking and low-power people benefit from the positive regard of high power people-we cannot conclusively describe that as the motivation. Our finding that power affects laughter when alone dovetails nicely with Fridlund's (1991b) description of implicit sociality, but this too needs to be established empirically. In short, the understanding of laughter and power would benefit from a clearer understanding of why low power enhances laughing.
Concluding Remarks
Laughing is an enjoyable experience, but it may also serve a purpose, particularly for those in positions of low power. Our suggestion is that one purpose of laughter is affiliation: Those without power are more likely to laugh as a way of garnering liking. These findings add to a surging increase in research on the cognitive, emotional, and behavioral consequences of power. Whereas recent research has focused primarily on the consequences of high power (Galinsky et al., 2003; Smith & Trope, 2006) , the current work examined how occupying positions of low power can influence behavioral responding. Low power may be a more common experience than high power, insofar as people probably follow externally mandated rules more frequently than they exert control over others. The high frequency of laughter in social interactions (more than once every 2 minutes; Vettin & Todt, 2004 ) may therefore be in part a result of the frequency with which people occupy or recall instances in which they occupied positions of low power. More broadly, the frequent use of social strategies that enhance liking, such as laughter, demonstrates the importance of procuring and maintaining positive relationships (Baumeister & Leary, 1995) .
